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Torture, extrajudicial killings and disappearances, suppression 
of the freedom of expression and association, and other breaches of 
fundamental human rights are widespread and systematic in North 
Korea. The United Nations Human Rights Council established the 
Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea in 2013, and the Commission’s report confirmed 
that widespread and grave violations of human rights are being com-
mitted in the country. As an effort to analyze the origins of human 
rights violations in North Korea, this Article examines the country’s 
penal system by cross-referencing North Korean statutes and defec-
tors’ testimonies. By comparing what the law stipulates with how the 
procedure is actually practiced, this Article attempts to illustrate how 
the North Korean penal law system is especially reliant on nonjudi-
cial punishment of political offenses through kwanriso camps, which 
admit a great number of political offenders and their families without 
going through the regular judicial process.
IntroductIon
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (hereinafter North 
Korea) has been portrayed in several different ways by the inter-
national community. First, the most common face of North Korea 
in the international community is that of a regional and global 
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security threat. North Korea’s development of nuclear weap-
ons and long-range missiles has been considered a serious danger 
in the region. Second, various humanitarian crises have drawn 
international attention to North Korea since the late 1990s, when 
the country suffered from serious famine. Pictures of starving, 
undernourished children, statistics reflecting the great number of 
refugees desperately hiding in China, reports confirming an astro-
nomical number of deaths during the famine,1 and the continuous 
suffering of the people from food shortages are vivid examples of the 
seriousness of this problem.2 Finally, there is a human rights dimen-
sion to North Korea’s problems. Because of the foregoing issues, the 
human rights aspect has often been viewed as less serious a concern 
by the international community, even if there is abundant evidence 
showing that human rights violations in the country are alarmingly 
grave and compelling.
Torture, extrajudicial killings and disappearances, suppression 
of the freedom of expression and association, and other breaches 
of fundamental human rights are widespread and systematic in 
North Korea.3 Since 2004, the United Nations has appointed a 
Special Rapporteur on North Korean human rights,4 and in March 
2013, the United Nations Human Rights Council established 
the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea to investigate systematic, wide-
spread, and grave violations of human rights.5 The report of the 
Commission of Inquiry was submitted to the UN Human Rights 
Council on February 17, 2014, and recommended that the UN 
Security Council refer crimes against humanity in North Korea to 
the International Criminal Court.6
North Korea tends to respond to these international criticisms 
with a flat denial. To identify human rights violations in North 
Korea is challenging because there are several significant hurdles. 
First, due to the regime’s lack of transparency, it is extremely diffi-
cult to obtain reliable information on political and legal issues. North 
Korea is a tightly sealed-off state, and it is hard to tell rumor from 
fact. Second, due to the tension between the two Koreas, it is hard 
to find an opportunity to discuss human rights conditions in the 
1. See Human rIgHts WatcH, The Invisible Exodus: North Koreans in the People’s 
Republic of China, 14 Hum. rts. WatcH rep. no. 8(c), Nov. 2002, https://www.hrw.
org/reports/2002/northkorea/norkor1102.pdf. This report was coauthored by Dinah 
Pokempner, Tae-Ung Baik, and Mike Jendrzejczyk.
2. Human rIgHts WatcH, World report 2012, at 356–57 (2012).
3. Human rIgHts WatcH, supra note 1.
4. Commission on Human Rights Res. 2004/13, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2004/13 
(Apr. 15, 2004).
5. Human Rights Council Res. 22/13, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/22/13 (Apr. 9, 2013).
6. Rep. of the Detailed Findings of the Comm. of Inquiry on Hum. Rts. in the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/CRP.1, ¶ 1211 (2014) 
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country,7 and, consequently, it is extremely hard to verify factual 
information. Moreover, because of their politically sensitive nature, 
any statement or assertion regarding these issues may be easily mis-
interpreted as having been influenced by political views or political 
affiliation.
Despite the methodological difficulties in researching North 
Korean human rights systems, the research environment is 
improving. A great number of North Korean statutes and regula-
tions that had not been disclosed in the past are now available (in 
Korean) in South Korea.8 Moreover, a good number of firsthand 
accounts and testimonies from North Korean refugees living in 
South Korea or China have been made available.9 Therefore, it is 
possible to analyze the North Korean penal system by cross-ref-
erencing North Korean statutes and the defectors’ testimonies. 
By comparing what the law stipulates with how the procedure is 
actually practiced in North Korea, we can obtain a better under-
standing of the criminal process and the human rights situation.10 
It is especially important to understand the criminal litigation of 
political offenses in North Korea. This Article attempts to illus-
trate how the North Korean penal law system is functioning, 
especially relying on nonjudicial punishments of political offenses 
through kwanriso camps, which admit a great number of politi-
cal offenders and their families without going through the regular 
judicial process.
I. overvIeW of tHe nortH Korean penal laW system
The criminal justice system in North Korea was heavily influ-
enced by the Soviet system, and shares some characteristics with 
the Chinese criminal justice system. The Criminal Act11 enumerates 
7. In South Korea, articles 3 and 7 of the Gukkaboanbeob [National Security 
Act], Act No. 5454, Dec. 13, 1997, and article 9 of the Nambukgyoryuhyopryukbeob 
[Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act], Act No. 10228, Apr. 5, 2010, prohibit 
unauthorized contact with people from North Korea or any acts benefiting North 
Korea. In North Korea, the Preamble to the Joseonnodongdanggyuyak [Rules of the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Workers’ Party], amended April 11, 2012, dem-
onstrates that North Korea still aims to “revolutionize” South Korea.
8. See 2015 cHoesIn BuKHan BeopryungjIp [2015 collectIon of current acts and 
regulatIons of nortH Korea] (Myung-Bong Chang ed., 2015). Because there is no offi-
cial English version of North Korean law available to date, the English translations 
of North Korean law given throughout this Article are by the author unless otherwise 
indicated.
9. I have collected approximately 150 testimonies that are relevant to my 
research through searching the literature and governmental documents, as well as 
through my personal interviews with North Korean refugees in South Korea.
10. There are relatively few publications on the North Korean legal system and 
most of those consist of reviews of North Korea’s historical legal development. The 
actual implications of the law for human rights in the context of punishment is sel-
dom explored, especially because of the lack of reliable data.
11. Hyongbeob [Criminal Act], amended and supplemented by Decree No. 2387 of 
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crimes in the legal system. According to the 2012 Criminal Act, a list 
of crimes is provided as follows:
• Crimes against the state and nation (Chapter 3),
• Crimes against the management of national defense (Chapter 4),
• Crimes against the socialist economy (Chapter 5),
• Crimes against the socialist culture (Chapter 6),
• Crimes against the state’s general administrative manage-
ment order (Chapter 7),
• Crimes against the socialist collective life order (Chapter 8), 
and
• Crimes against citizens’ life and property (Chapter 9).
The Criminal Act demonstrates that the protection of the state 
has been highly emphasized over other crimes. For example, the anti-
state and anti-nation crimes occupy three sections of the Act with 
fourteen provisions (from article 60 to article 73).12 The list of crimes 
includes conspiracy to subvert the state (article 60), terrorism (article 
61), anti-state propaganda and agitation (article 62), treason against the 
Fatherland (article 63), treason against the nation (article 68), harbor-
ing an individual who committed a crime against the state or the nation 
(article 71), and failure to report a crime against the state or the nation 
(article 72).
The punishments for these crimes are generally severe, rang-
ing from years of reform through labor, to reform through labor for 
life, to the death penalty.13 However, the constituent elements of the 
crimes against the state are overbroad and ambiguous. For example, 
article 60 provides:
A person who, with anti-state purposes, participates in a 
coup d’état, riot, demonstration or assault, or takes part in a 
conspiracy to commit those acts shall be punished by reform 
through labor for more than five years. In cases where the 
person commits a grave offense, he or she shall be punished 
by reform through labor without term, or by the death pen-
alty and confiscation of property.
This provision can serve to punish virtually any type of anti-state or 
anti-government activities, including activities that should be per-
mitted as an exercise of the internationally guaranteed right to free-
dom of expression. Article 63, punishing the crime of treason against 
“the Fatherland,” is equally overbroad and ambiguous. It punishes a 
citizen who commits “acts against the Fatherland by defection, sur-
render, betrayal, or disclosure of secrets” by reform through labor for 
12. Id. arts. 60–73.
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more than five years.14 It also adds that a grave offense shall be pun-
ished by a life sentence to reform through labor or the death penalty 
and confiscation of property.15
Official punishments for crimes in North Korea are enumerated 
in article 27 of the Criminal Act as follows:
• Death penalty,
• Reform through labor for life,
• Reform through labor with a limited term,
• Labor training,
• Deprivation of the right to vote,
• Confiscation of property,
• Fines,
• Forfeiture of a licence, and
• Suspension of a licence.
The latter five punishments are supplementary punishments applied 
in conjunction with the regular punishments.16
In 1999, North Korea abolished the practice of interpretation of 
the law by analogy,17 which had been criticized for punishing acts not 
identified in any enumerated law through analogy to the constitu-
ent elements of a crime involving similar circumstances. The 1999 
amendment significantly reduced the number of crimes punishable 
by the death penalty to only five, but a 2009 amendment increased 
the number to six by adding the crime of destruction and sabo-
tage.18 However, in addition to the crimes in the Criminal Act, a new 
Addendum to the Criminal Act was adopted in 2007, which intro-
duced seventeen new crimes punishable by death.19
The process of punishment and criminal adjudication in North 
Korea is governed by the Criminal Procedure Act,20 which covers 
investigation, preliminary examination, prosecution, trial, and the 
execution of the sentence (see Figure 1). The North Korean Criminal 
Procedure Act demonstrates a couple of serious legal flaws. First, 
there is no concept of a guaranteed right against self-incrimination 
14. Id. art. 63.
15. Id.
16. Id. art. 28.
17. Hyongbeob [Criminal Act], amended and supplemented by Decree No. 953, 
Aug. 11, 1999, art. 10.
18. Hyongbeob [Criminal Act], amended and supplemented by Decree No. 27, Apr. 
28, 2009, art. 64.
19. See Hyongbeob Buchick [Addendum to the Criminal Act], adopted by 
Decree No. No. 2483, Dec. 19, 2007, arts. 1–23, available in 2015 cHoesIn BuKHan 
BeopryungjIp, supra note 8, at 254.
20. See Hyongsasosongbeob [Criminal Procedure Act], amended and supple-
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in the North Korean criminal justice system. The Constitution does 
not have any provision guaranteeing the right to remain silent, and 
no such right is protected under the criminal law or criminal proce-
dure.21 On the contrary, each defendant is expected to speak to the 
investigators, preliminary examiners, prosecutors, and judges.22 
There is a strong expectation that the defendants should make 
self-incriminatory statements.23 Second, in terms of the evidentiary 
standard, the exclusionary rule of evidence is acknowledged in very 
limited situations, such as in the case of testimonies obtained under 
duress or inducement24 or when a confession is the only evidence.25 
However, there is no “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine or general 
prohibition against the use of hearsay evidence. Moreover, the right 
to counsel is also quite limited; an attorney can be retained only 
after a formal charge is laid by the preliminary examiners.26
II. tHe process of crImInal punIsHment
The actual process of criminal punishment can be explained by 
way of some exemplary cases. The following three examples offer 
21. Article 166 of the Criminal Procedure Act, id., only prohibits the use of lead-
ing questions to force admission of a crime or statement.
22. Article 283 of the Criminal Procedure Act, id., provides: “At trial, the accused 
should answer questions when asked, and cannot leave the court without the judge’s 
permission.”
23. Id. art. 283.
24. Id. art 37.
25. Id.
26. Id. art. 62. See also BeoBWonHaengjeongcHeo [supreme court of Kor., offIce 
of court admIn.], BuKHan saBeoBjedo gaeguan [IntroductIon to tHe nortH Korean 
judIcIary system ch. 7 (Bukhandeui Byeonghosajedo Gaeguan [Introduction to the 
Lawyer System in North Korea]) (1996).









niversity user on 12 February 2020
897NONJUDICIAL PUNISHMENTS IN NORTH KOREA2016]
a clearer understanding of the nature of punishments of political 
offenses in North Korea.
A. Three Illustrative Cases
1. Kim Kwang-Soo27
Kim Kwang-Soo was born in China in 1963. He had lived in 
Hoiryong since he was seven years old. He was arrested in July 
1999 by the North Korean Ministry of State Security28 while he 
was sleeping at home. Kim was severely tortured by the agency 
during interrogations in an underground interrogation facility in 
Hoiryong until April 2000. He said that he was severely beaten 
and tortured in numerous ways, and that he lost most of his teeth 
during this process. Because of the torture and the cruel and inhu-
mane treatment he endured during the investigation, his weight 
dropped from 165 pounds (seventy-five kilograms) to eighty-three 
pounds (thirty-eight kilograms). He was charged with espionage, 
considered an anti-state or anti-nation crime. Although he initially 
denied the crime, he eventually pleaded guilty to espionage due to 
the continuous torture. Despite Kim’s confession, he was given no 
semblance of an ordinary trial process. He was only interviewed 
by the chief prosecutor from the Ministry of State Security, and 
this interview did not take place until the end of the preliminary 
examination.
In April 2000, he was sent to a kwanriso known as the 15th 
Yodok Administrative Camp.29 Kim was later told by a guard at the 
camp that his life was saved because one of Kim’s friends, who was 
working for the Ministry of State Security, worked behind the scenes 
to help him. He spent three years in Yodok. After being released from 
the camp in 2003, he crossed the border into China and eventually 
defected to South Korea in April 2004.
27. This name (which, like those of many of the defectors, is a pseudo-
nym) may also be romanized as “Kim Gwang-Soo.” For the testimonial, see Kim 
Gwang-Soo, Hoeryong Bouibu Jihagambanggua Yodeoksuyongsoehseo gyokeun 
Chamhokhan Gotong [Indescribable Pain that I Experienced in an Underground 
Cell of the Hoeryong Ministry of State Security and in Yodok Camp], cItIzens’ all. 
for n. Korean Human rIgHts, http://kor.nkhumanrights.or.kr/kor/datacenter/related_
write.php?mode=view&bbs_idx=7623. An English translation of the original Korean 
version is available under the title Unforgettable Misery in Hoeryeong Security 
Agency and Yodeok Political Prisoner Camp on the English side of the Citizens’ 
Alliance website at http://eng.nkhumanrights.or.kr/eng/datacenter/related_write.
php?mode=view&bbs_idx=4420.
28. The translation of Gukga Anjeon Bowibu in this Article is the “Ministry of 
State Security,” following the official usage in North Korea. The same government 
agency is often translated as the “National Security Agency” or the “State Security 
Agency.”
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2. Kim Eun-Chul30
Kim Eun-Chul was first arrested by Russian border guards in 
November 1999. His case became known to the Western world when 
he was arrested because he, along with six other escapees, were inter-
viewed by UNHCR staff in 2000. In the interview, he requested to be 
sent to South Korea. However, Russian authorities refused to send 
him to South Korea and ordered that he be repatriated to China, 
which meant that he would eventually be sent back to North Korea. 
He managed to escape while in transit through China as he was 
about to be sent back to North Korea, but after several months, in 
January 2000, he was captured in the North Korean county of Musan.
After his capture, he was interrogated and tortured by an official 
in the Ministry of State Security. Kim Eun-Chul met a similar fate 
to Kim Kwang-Soo; he was not tried in court and he was eventually 
sent to the same camp in Yodok on June 30, 2000. Kim Eun-Chul was 
held at Yodok for three years until his release in July 2003.
After his release from Yodok, he engaged in activities that vio-
lated local regulations and was arrested for those activities in 
October 2004. This time, he was charged with bribery and impris-
oned. Because bribery is considered a non-political crime, he was 
tried in a court and sentenced to short-term labor training at the 
Musan Labor Training Center. After he was released from the center, 
he crossed the border. He later defected to South Korea in 2006. Kim 
Eun-Chul’s experiences clearly demonstrate that anti-state or anti-
nation crimes are treated differently than ordinary crimes.
3. Kim Hyuk31
Kim Hyuk was born in 1982 in Chongjin and adopted by an 
orphanage in 1995. He was arrested for multiple counts of illegal 
border crossing and larceny in March 1999. Originally he was sus-
pected of political crimes, but he successfully argued that he had 
not engaged in any political activities, and that he was only help-
ing a starving woman and her children. He was sent to trial while 
detained in the Onsung jibkyulso (concentration center), and was 
sentenced to three years of reform through labor at a kyohwaso 
30. See Kim Eun-Cheol, Gangjesonghwanhu Yodoksuyongsoehseo 3nyeon [Three 
Years in Yodok After Being Repatriated from Russia], cItIzens’ all. for n. Korean 
Human rIgHts, http://kor.nkhumanrights.or.kr/kor/datacenter/related_write.
php?mode=view&bbs_idx=7622. An English translation, After Repatriation: I Spent 
Three Years in Yodok, is available at http://eng.nkhumanrights.or.kr/eng/datacenter/
related_write.php?mode=view&bbs_idx=4419.
31. See Kim Hyuk, Joisudo Inganida [Prisoners Are Still Human Beings], 
cItIzens’ all. for n. Korean Human rIgHts. The Korean original is divided among sev-
eral pages, beginning at http://kor.nkhumanrights.or.kr/kor/datacenter/related_write.
php?mode=view&bbs_idx=7604. An English translation of part of the original testi-
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(reform through labor center) for multiple counts of larceny and 
smuggling maize into China. He was sent to a regular prison called 
the Jeongeori kyohwaso in Hoiryong to serve his term after the trial. 
Fortunately, he survived the terrible life in prison and was released 
when a general amnesty was issued in 2000. He crossed the border 
to China on December 24, 2000, and eventually made his way into 
Mongolia. He was found by Mongolian authorities in July 2001, and 
they sent him to South Korea on September 20, 2001.
***
These three cases demonstrate patterns of criminal process in 
North Korea. First, there are multiple actors involved. Judicial insti-
tutions such as prosecutors, judges, investigators, preliminary exam-
iners, and attorneys play roles, but the way they function depends 
upon the nature of the crime. Security organizations such as the 
Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of People’s Security32 are 
extensively involved in the process of arrest, investigation, examina-
tion, and prosecution. Even the execution of sentences is overseen 
by these agencies. Several criminal enforcement institutions, such 
as reform through labor centers (kyohwaso), concentration centers 
(jibkyolso), and labor training centers (nodongdanryundae), are used 
for different purposes. Special institutions called kwanriso, which 
can literally be translated as “administrative camps,” are also used 
for punishing political offenses and are the site of frequent human 
rights violations. Kwanriso, which are essentially specially controlled 
towns or villages that function as enormous prison complexes, are 
discussed in greater depth in Part III.B.
Administrative authorities such as the People’s Assembly, 
the Workers’ Party, working units of factories and farms, military 
units, and community organizations such as the Socialist Legal Life 
Supervision Committee and Comrade Judgment Council all play 
some role in the process. We cannot say that any one institution is 
solely responsible for all of the human rights violations. By reviewing 
the whole penal law system, we should be able to trace the origin of 
human rights violations at each procedural stage.
B. Investigation
The Criminal Procedure Act of North Korea divides criminal 
investigation into two stages: investigation and preliminary exami-
nation.33 Investigation is the first stage of criminal procedure, and 
32. This is the official translation of Inmin boanbu, which is the North Korean 
police service. The name of the institution was changed in 2010 from its previous 
name, Inmin boanseong.
33. The preliminary investigation system had been used under Japanese colonial 
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focuses on discovering criminal offenders.34 Investigation is con-
ducted by an investigator from either the Ministry of State Security 
or the Ministry of People’s Security, depending upon the nature of 
the crime to be investigated.35 If necessary, a prosecutor may directly 
investigate a crime.36
Under the Criminal Procedure Act, the role of an investigator 
is limited to discovering criminal offenders.37 An investigator is not 
normally given the power to arrest and detain a criminal suspect. 
An investigator is not permitted to collect any more evidence once 
a criminal is discovered.38 The Act stipulates that an arrest should 
normally be made after a decision to institute legal proceedings is 
made, and that it is justified to prevent the accused from evading the 
preliminary examination or trial, or from hindering the investigation 
of crimes.39 Only in certain situations, such as a flagrant offense or 
where there is a likelihood that the person will flee, can an inves-
tigator arrest and conduct a search and seizure without obtaining 
permission from a prosecutor.40 Even in those cases, the investigator 
must acquire a prosecutor’s approval within forty-eight hours, and 
the suspect or criminal must be investigated and handed over for a 
preliminary examination within ten days.41
However, in reality, these provisions are not enforced. Arrest 
and search and seizure widely take place long before the prelimi-
nary examination by the Ministry of State Security and Ministry 
of People’s Safety begins.42 This is in part because of the obscure 
34. The activities of the investigators should be limited to the discovery of crimi-
nals before handing them over to the preliminary examiners for the examination 
stage. See Hyongsasosongbeob [Criminal Procedure Act], May 14, 2012, art. 133.
35. Id. art. 10 (Person in Charge of Investigation). The Ministry of State Security 
investigates offenses against the state and the nation, while the Ministry of People’s 
Security investigates general criminal cases. Id. art. 46 (Investigational Jurisdiction). 
In the same vein, special investigation authorities such as the Railway People’s 
Security Bureau, the Railway Prosecution Bureau, and the Military Prosecution 
Bureau may have jurisdiction over specific crimes as assigned by the law. Id. art. 
47 (Jurisdiction of Special Investigation Authorities). The prosecutorial authorities 
investigate general crimes arising in the course of monitoring administrative eco-
nomic projects or the enforcement measures for legal compliance by law enforcement 
agencies. Id. art. 46.
36. Id. art. 10 (Person in Charge of Investigation).
37. Id. art. 133. The law provides, however, that in order to discover a criminal, 
an investigator is allowed to conduct verification, search and seizure, psychological 
examinations, identification, cross-examination, and appraisal. Id. art. 137.
38. Id. art. 140. There is an exception when evidence collection cannot be delayed.
39. Id. arts. 175, 177–78.
40. Id. art. 142.
41. If an investigator fails to obtain a prosecutor’s approval for the arrest, the 
detained person should be released immediately. The person should also be released 
when the investigator cannot certify, within ten days from the day of the arrest, that 
the suspect is indeed a criminal. Id. art. 143.
42. When a person subject to a preliminary examination is seriously ill or an 
accused is in a state of temporary mental imbalance or falls seriously ill and can-
not be subject to an inquiry into the case, the case shall be suspended. Id. art. 
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language of the Act’s provisions. For example, article 145 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act states that if the criminal has fled, or if 
the criminal’s place of residence is unclear at the time the decision 
is made to hand over the person for preliminary examination, the 
investigator must arrest the criminal and hand him or her over to 
the examiner.43 This provision in fact gives the investigator broad 
power to arrest the accused.
C. Preliminary Examination
Following the investigation, the preliminary examination 
stage begins. Under the Criminal Procedure Act, the task of a pre-
liminary examiner is to identify the person to be examined and to 
reveal all aspects of a criminal case.44 The preliminary examiners 
are in charge of the activities of examination, arrest, and detention 
of suspects, as well as verification, appraisal, search, seizure, exam-
ination of a witness, cross-examination, identification, confiscation 
of criminally obtained property or securities, and so forth.45 Much 
lawless interrogation and torture takes place at the preliminary 
examination stage.
The North Korean Criminal Procedure Act stipulates that 
crimes against the state and nation are under the jurisdiction of 
the preliminary examiners from the Ministry of State Security, 
and that ordinary criminal cases are dealt with by examiners 
from the Ministry of People’s Security.46 Defectors consistently 
attest in their testimonies that border-crossers are initially 
investigated by officers from the Ministry of State Security sta-
tioned near the border when they are arrested and extradited 
of serious illness after arrest and repatriation from China to North Korea. See, 
e.g., Chung Mi-Ok, Heemangeobneun Tangeul Duirohago [Leaving Behind the 
Hopeless Land], cItIzens’ all. for n. Korean Human rIgHts, http://kor.nkhuman-
rights.or.kr/kor/datacenter/related_write.php?mode=view&bbs_idx=7627. If the 
grounds for suspension of the criminal proceedings are no longer relevant or if 
the person who received the medical treatment measure violates legal provisions, 
the  suspension of the criminal case shall be withdrawn or canceled. Criminal 
Procedure Act art. 105.
43. Criminal Procedure Act art. 145. The investigation should conclude when the 
investigator discovers the perpetrator of a criminal act and decides to hand over the 
case for preliminary examination.
44. Id. art. 147. Preliminary examiners should clarify the character of the 
offence, the motives for and aim of the offence, the means and methods of the crime, 
the degree of the action and its consequences, the role of the accused, and the degree 
of the offender’s responsibility in committing the crime. Id. art 148.
45. Id. ch. 2.
46. Criminal cases arising in the course of monitoring administrative economic 
projects or in the process of supervising the enforcement measures of the law enforce-
ment agency for legal compliance are examined by an examiner from the Prosecutors’ 
Office. Examiners from special preliminary examination authorities, such as the 
Military Prosecution Bureau, the Railway People’s Security Bureau, and the Railway 
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from China to North Korea.47 In the initial investigation, if the 
alleged offenses are political in nature, the offender will be sent 
to the Ministry of State Security for examination. For example, 
those who contact businessmen or missionary groups from South 
Korea are considered political offenders and interrogated by 
examiners from the Ministry of State Security. Those who have 
simply escaped from the country for food or other economic rea-
sons are transferred to the Ministry of People’s Security and sub-
ject to the ordinary penal process.
A decision to commence a preliminary examination is supposed 
to be made within forty-eight hours of transferring a criminal case 
from an investigation authority to preliminary examiners.48 A pre-
liminary examiner subsequently makes a decision whether to charge 
the person with criminal responsibility after gathering sufficient 
evidence, which is the point when the examiner must inform the 
accused of the commencement decision.49 The accused must also be 
informed of the right to be assisted by counsel.50 Attorneys are only 
hired at this late stage of the examination, and the accused can eas-
ily be subjected to illegal interrogation and torture.
The broad use of arrest and prolonged detention are also seri-
ous problems in the penal process. Arrest and detention are allowed 
for crimes punishable by reform through labor or the death pen-
alty,51 and only when it is “particularly necessary” for crimes pun-
ishable by labor training. However, it is problematic that most 
people who have allegedly committed minor offenses punishable 
by labor training or less are still interrogated and detained during 
the preliminary examination. The ambiguity of the language in the 
law—for example, “particularly necessary”—may be blamed for the 
abuse. Furthermore, there are cases of flat denial of the law. While 
47. See, e.g., Shin Jeong-Ai, Ilbonehseo Bukjoseoneuro Bukjoseonehseo 
Hangukeuroeui Gil [From Japan to North Korea and Then to South Korea], 
cItIzens’ all. for n. Korean Human rIgHts, http://kor.nkhumanrights.or.kr/kor/data-
center/related_write.php?mode=view&bbs_idx=7588 (English version of the tes-
timony available at http://eng.nkhumanrights.or.kr/eng/datacenter/related_write.
php?mode=view&bbs_idx=4396); Kang Won Chul, Woncheoliga Gyeoken Jibgyulso 
Saenghwal [The Horror of the North Korean Detention Center], cItIzens’ all. for 
n. Korean Human rIgHts, http://kor.nkhumanrights.or.kr/kor/datacenter/related_
write.php?mode=view&bbs_idx=7548 (English version of the testimony available at 
http://eng.nkhumanrights.or.kr/eng/datacenter/related_write.php?mode=view&bbs_
idx=4367); Jung Hak-Min, Baega Gopa Talbukhangossi Jeoga Doieo [Crime of 
Defecting from North Korea Out of Hunger], talBuKjadongjIHoI [assocIatIon of nortH 
Korean refugees], Aug. 21, 2007, http://nkd.or.kr/news/story/view/688.
48. Criminal Procedure Act art. 156.
49. Id. art. 157. Within forty-eight hours of the decision, the accused shall be 
notified of the decision and of his or her right to obtain assistance from counsel. Id. 
art. 158.
50. Once the decision is made to lay a charge of criminal responsibility, the 
accused must be notified. A preliminary examiner must begin the examination 
within forty-eight hours of the decision. Id. art. 158.
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the Criminal Procedure Act prohibits the arrest and detention of 
pregnant women between their third and seventh months of preg-
nancy,52 defector testimony attests that not only is arrest and deten-
tion widely exercised against pregnant women, but miscarriage is 
generally induced through intensive physical labor.53 The provisions 
imposing limits on arrest and detention are thus not truly respected.
With respect to procedural due process, article 182 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act provides that, when a decision on arrest and detention 
is made, the examiners should notify the accused of the decision, and 
should also inform the family or his or her work unit within forty-
eight hours of the reason for the detention and the place where the 
person is held.54 However, this provision does not seem to be fully 
enforced either. In North Korea, enforced or involuntary disappear-
ances are happening everywhere, and the fates and whereabouts of 
the arrestees are generally not known to their families and relatives, 
which serves as grounds for the widespread fear of the penal process.55
The law provides that the arrest of an offender requires a war-
rant.56 However, as in China, warrants for arrest, search, or seizure 
are issued not by a judge but by a prosecutor.57 This means that the 
court does not have a chance to oversee the process of examination 
and, because the prosecutor’s supervision of the examination pro-
cess is also minimal, the accused is subject solely to the discretion 
of the investigating and examining authorities. That explains why so 
many human rights violations are reported during this preliminary 
examination stage.
Prolonged detention during the preliminary examination can 
happen for multiple reasons. The conclusion of preliminary examina-
tions must be attended by the prosecutor,58 and the examiner should 
transfer the records and evidence to a prosecutor.59 If grounds for 
dismissal are met,60 a preliminary examiner may dismiss a case with 
prosecutorial approval.61 The preliminary examination must be fin-
ished within two months of its commencement for ordinary crimes 
and within ten days for crimes punishable by labor training.62 In 
52. Id. art. 178.
53. See Seong-Ho Je, Bukhan Yeoseongeui Inkwoneui Siltaewa Guaje [The 
Present Situation of North Korean Women’s Human Rights and Tasks for Their 
Improvement], 47 tongIl munje yeongu [unIfIcatIon researcH] 177, 200 (2007).
54. Criminal Procedure Act art. 182.
55. Rep. of the Comm., supra note 6, ¶ 698.
56. Criminal Procedure Act art. 179.
57. Id. art. 180. Cf. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa (中华人民
共和国刑事诉讼法) [Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (prom-
ulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 14, 2012, effective Jan. 1, 
2013), art. 87, 2012 standIng comm. nat’l people’s cong. gaz. 143 (China).
58. Criminal Procedure Act art. 255.
59. Id. art. 257.
60. For the list of the grounds, see id. art. 106.
61. Id. art. 108.
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complex criminal cases, the county, district, or provincial prelimi-
nary examiners can receive an extension of one month tacked onto 
the detention period with the approval of the chief prosecutor of the 
District Prosecutors’ Office. In particularly complex criminal cases 
requiring further time after the detention period, an extra two-
month extension may be obtained through the approval of the chief 
prosecutor of the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office.63 If cases are sent 
back by the prosecutors or judges for additional examination, the 
detention may be extended for another twenty days.64 In total, the 
maximum detention period for a preliminary examination must not 
be longer than five months and twenty days from the commencement 
date of the preliminary examination, and one month and fifteen days 
for crimes punishable by labor training. Shin Jeong-Ae was detained 
for five months for preliminary examination in 1999. Lee Baek-Yong 
and Kim Hyuk were also under preliminary examination for five to 
six months from December 1994 to April 1995, and in 1999, respec-
tively.65 However, Chang Young-gul testified that he was subject to 
preliminary examination for a year before he was sent to Yodok in 
1997, which was much longer than the legally allowed period.66 The 
law does not specify how many times there may be an extension 
based on the “particularly complex case” grounds. Similarly, while 
the law provides a limitation on the detention period for criminal 
cases returned by a court, there is no provision describing how many 
times a case may be returned.67 Prolonged detention can easily hap-
pen in this process.
Detention takes place in three forms: custodial detention, house 
detention, and regional detention.68 The law provides limits on the 
detention period only for custodial detention. It is uncertain whether 
the detention period specified for custodial detention also applies to 
house detention and regional detention, and whether the detention 
ends with the conclusion of the preliminary examination period.
D. Prosecution
The prosecutor should hand over an examinee to a court after a 
full review of the case records has determined that all aspects of the 
63. Id. art. 187. The detention period for crimes punishable by labor training may 
be extended up to a month with prosecutorial approval. Id. arts. 150, 187.
64. Id. art. 186. Preliminary examinations of cases that have been returned by 
a court must be completed within ten days. However, there is no provision regard-
ing a time limit for preliminary examination applicable to those cases returned by a 
prosecutor.
65. See Lee Baek-Yong, Jiokeui Bukhan Jeongchibumsuyongso [Hell-Like North 
Korean Political Prison Camp] (2004), available at talBuKjadongjIHoI [assocIatIon of 
nortH Korean refugees], http://nkd.or.kr/news/story/view/401; Kim Hyuk, supra note 31.
66. See Chang Young-gul, Chungseongeul Dahaettaneun Joi [A Crime to be Loyal 
to the Regime], saengmyonggua InqWon [lIfe and Human rIgHts], Spring 2012, at 40.
67. Criminal Procedure Act art. 267.
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crime have been completely and accurately discovered in the prelimi-
nary examination.69 Only prosecutors can prosecute, and they must 
decide whether to do so within ten days of receiving case records 
from a preliminary examiner. The detention period allowed for the 
prosecution is ten days. Criminal cases punishable by labor training 
must be processed within three days70 and the detention period for 
those crimes is limited to three days.71
The prosecution draws up a written indictment.72 If indictment 
is not possible due to an inadequate preliminary examination, the 
prosecutor can send the case back to the preliminary examination 
stage with a written justification.73 It is problematic that a prosecu-
tor or judge may send the case back to preliminary examiners instead 
of dismissing it on the grounds that the preliminary examination is 
insufficient. A prosecutor can also suspend an indictment,74 dismiss a 
criminal case,75 or subject the accused to social education measures.76
E. Trial
The lowest court in North Korea is the People’s Court, which hears 
most first-instance cases.77 However, the Provincial Court, the high 
court of a province, is the court of first instance for cases related to 
crimes against the state and the nation.78 If a case is indicted with the 
possibility of the death penalty or a life-term of reform through labor, 
the Provincial Court again has jurisdiction.79 Otherwise, the People’s 
Court is the first-instance court, while the Provincial Court hears 
appellate cases from the People’s Court. However, if the Provincial 
Court finds it necessary, it may directly try a case falling under the 
jurisdiction of the People’s Court.80 There are also two special courts, 
namely the Military Court and the Railway Court.81
69. Id. art. 260. In deciding whether or not to prosecute, a prosecutor must 
review the following: whether all aspects of the crime and all facts relevant to resolv-
ing the crime have been completely and accurately discovered; whether there is suf-
ficient evidence; whether the preliminary examination was conducted in accordance 
with the requirements and procedure prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Act; and 
whether the provisions of the criminal law were properly applied to the crime. See id. 
art. 263.
70. Id. art. 261.
71. Id. art. 262.
72. Id. art. 264.
73. Id. art. 267.
74. Id. art. 97.
75. Id. art. 107.
76. Id. art. 116. For more information about social education, see infra Part III.
77. Criminal Procedure Act art. 50.
78. Id. art. 51.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. The Military Court tries criminal cases committed by a member of the mili-
tary or an agent of the Ministry of People’s Security, while the Railway Court tries 
cases of criminal offenses that were committed by employees of the railway transpor-
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The Supreme Court,82 the highest court in North Korea, hears 
cases on appeal and cases contesting first-instance decisions by 
either the Provincial Court or the Railway Court. If necessary, and 
regardless of which court has jurisdiction, the Supreme Court can 
directly hear any first-instance case or transfer the case to any other 
court of the same level or type as the court of original jurisdiction.83
Even though there are three hierarchical levels of courts, the 
North Korean court system functions as a two-instance system, 
allowing for only one appeal. Moreover, because the Provincial Court 
(the second-highest level) and the Supreme Court (the highest level) 
have the power to hear first-instance cases without any appeal, the 
benefits of the two-instance system may be nullified at the will of the 
courts. Under the North Korean criminal law system, the accused 
has the duty to participate in the trial. If the accused refuses to par-
ticipate, he or she will be detained during the trial.84
In memoirs written by defectors, statements related to trial pro-
cedure are rarely found, especially when compared to the abundance 
of statements about the detention and preliminary examination 
phases. This phenomenon seems related to the fact that the defec-
tors seldom experience anything special in the trials, other than the 
confirmation of a factual relationship between the crime and the 
sentence.85
Regarding a trial timeline, the trial court proceedings should end 
within twenty-five days from the case filing date, or within ten days for 
those accused of crimes punishable by labor training. The time limit 
for a trial can be extended by five days for particularly complex cases.86 
Second-instance trials must be concluded within twenty-five days.87 The 
allowable detention period is the same, only twenty-five days, which is 
reduced to fifteen days for crimes punishable by labor training.88 With 
this extremely short trial period of twenty-five days, it is questionable 
whether defendants are fully guaranteed their due process rights.
When the court finds the accused innocent, waives the punish-
ment, suspends the execution of the punishment, imposes a social 
education measure, or dismisses the case, the accused is released.89 
82. The name of the Court was changed from Central Court to Supreme Court in 
2010.
83. Criminal Procedure Act art. 53. Matthew Todd Miller was given a six-year 
sentence by the Supreme Court on September 14, 2014, for his alleged anti-state 
activities. Jang Song-Thaek was tried by the Special Military Tribunal and exe-
cuted in December 2013. See Yeongjong Lee, Buk, Miguggin Matthew Todd Miller 
eh Yuknyon Nodonggyohwahyeong Seongo [North Korea, Six Year Reform Through 
Labor Sentence for American Matthew Todd Miller], jungang IlBo daIly (Sept. 14, 
2014), http://news.joins.com/article/15802646.
84. Criminal Procedure Act art. 280.
85. See, e.g., Kim Hyuk, supra note 31.
86. Criminal Procedure Act art. 286.
87. Id. art. 365.
88. Id. art. 281.
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Otherwise, the court’s punishment is carried out in the name of the 
state. There are three ways to challenge the court’s decision: appeal, 
emergency appeal, and retrial. The accused, defense counsel, and 
claimant for damages may appeal to a higher court.90 In the same 
vein, the prosecutor may submit a protest.91 In the appellate trial, 
the court cannot levy a heavier punishment than what was sen-
tenced by the lower court.92 An emergency appeal is an appeal filed 
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or the Chief Prosecutor of 
the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office to the Supreme Court93 in order to 
correct a judgment that is contrary to the requirements of the law.94 
The Criminal Procedure Act generally allows an emergency appeal 
seeking a higher punishment, unless the limitation period for the 
higher punishment has expired.95 Giving the higher court the power 
to mete out a greater punishment in emergency appeals is problem-
atic and entails a negative influence on the accused. With the lack of 
a prescribed time limit for filing an emergency appeal, the accused 
can be put in an unstable position for a prolonged period of time.
A retrial is permitted on a limited basis as a means to correct 
any mistakes in the decision and ruling (pangyeol and panjeong),96 
but it can only be requested by the Chief Prosecutor of the Supreme 
Prosecutors’ Office to the Supreme Court.97 This could be disadvanta-
geous to victims because the prosecution could disregard the victims’ 
voices without a court review.
The Criminal Procedure Act also allows for the organization 
of an “on-site public trial” to raise public awareness and prevent 
crime.98 In an on-site public trial, the representatives of institutions, 
enterprises, or organizations participate, and the public is mobilized 
to watch the proceedings.
Another problematic feature of the process is that a judge may 
refer a case back to the prosecutor, just as a prosecutor can return a 
case to the preliminary examiner. Judges can take this step if they 
determine that the crime was not sufficiently investigated in the pre-
liminary examination to render a judgment or if procedural princi-
ples were seriously violated to the point that the judgment may be 
affected.99 Because the case is not dismissed but rather sent back 
90. Id. art. 356.
91. Id.
92. Id. art. 380.
93. Id. art. 388.
94. Id. art. 383.
95. The Criminal Procedure Act prohibits an emergency appeal seeking a higher 
punishment only when the statute of limitation period has already expired. Id. art. 
391.
96. Id. art. 402.
97. See id. arts. 406, 408. A retrial is allowed when the evidence on which the 
judgment was based is found to be false or a new fact that could have influenced the 
judgment is later discovered.
98. Id. art. 285.
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to a prosecutor when there is insufficient evidence or a violation of 
legal procedure, the accused in such situations are put in serious 
jeopardy. This provision also discourages the accused from raising 
any serious challenges at trial.
F. Execution of Sentence
The execution of a sentence follows the judgment or decision,100 
and is governed by the Criminal Procedure Act and the Execution 
of Sentences and Decisions Act.101 The death penalty is carried out 
upon the issuance of an execution order document by the Supreme 
Court.102 It should be performed in the presence of a prosecutor103 by 
the sentence-execution institution that received the death warrant 
and a copy of the judgement.104
Although public executions are performed in North Korea,105 
there is no provision governing public executions in the Criminal 
Procedure Act. There has been speculation that public execu-
tion happens after an on-the-spot trial.106 However, it seems that, 
at executions, the judge only reads the list of offenses, while the 
administration ensures that people living in the nearby town come 
to observe the execution. The purpose of public executions is appar-
ently to terrorize the people so that they will not attempt to commit 
similar crimes. Even though North Korean authorities try to justify 
this as a necessary measure to deter crime, the practice of public 
executions is blatantly against the standards of international human 
rights.107
Regarding sentences of imprisonment, there are two distinct 
types of facilities used. The first are regular prison facilities, i.e., 
prisons where those convicted under the criminal law are sent, such 
as (i) provincial concentration centers (dojibkyeolso), (ii) reform 
through labor centers (kyohwaso), and (iii) labor training centers 
(nodongdanryeondae). These regular prison facilities are for those 
100. See id. art. 418.
101. See id. ch. 9; Pangyol Panjeong Jiphaengbeob [Execution of Sentences and 
Decisions Act], Nov. 19, 1998.
102. Criminal Procedure Act art. 421; Execution of Sentences and Decisions Act 
art. 32.
103. Criminal Procedure Act art. 420.
104. Id. art. 421.
105. Park Su-jong, advisor to the North Korean Supreme Court, acknowledged 
that public executions are used for extremely bad criminals after the court’s review 
of petitions from the public. See No Gil-nam, Gacha Ingwontaryeong Jinchareul 
Guchookhalsu Eopta: Choigo Jaepanso Tambang [Fake Human Rights Propaganda 
Cannot Deny the Truth: A Visit to the Supreme Court], mInjoKtongsIn [nat’l comm’cns] 
(Sept. 16, 2014), https://archive.is/HdK19.
106. Changdong Choi, Bukhaneui 2004 nyeon Hyongbeop Gaejeong mit Ingweon 
Sanghwangeui Beopjeok Munje [Legal Issues in the 2004 Amendment of the Criminal 
Act and the Human Rights Situation], 155 jeongcHaeKyeongu [pol’y stud.] 172 (2007).
107. See Caycie D. Bradford, Waiting to Die, Dying to Live, 5 InterdIsc. j. Hum. rts. 
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who commit ordinary crimes, and are also used for some serious 
political crimes. However, there is another type of facility housing 
offenders of political crimes labeled anti-state or anti-nation crimes, 
called a kwanriso (“administrative camp”). A kwanriso can hold 
offenders whose crimes are not specified under the criminal law, and 
is used to punish both political offenders and their families.108
G. Observations
There are several weaknesses in North Korean criminal procedure. 
First of all, as noted above, an investigator or examiner needs to obtain 
an arrest warrant. However, it is not issued by a judge, but by a pros-
ecutor. The decision to conduct a search and seizure is also made by 
a prosecutor, or by a statement of the decision signed by a prosecutor. 
The detention of the accused is often prolonged, and there are no speci-
fied time limits for house detention or regional detention. Furthermore, 
the lack of prosecutorial supervision over the preliminary examination 
contributes to the human rights violations that occur during the early 
stages of preparation for trial. The right to counsel is enumerated in 
the Criminal Procedure Act,109 but is only guaranteed after the point 
when the preliminary examiner reaches a decision to formally lay 
a charge of criminal responsibility in the case.110 In other words, the 
examinees may be subject to serious abuses until the examiner makes 
a formal decision, without being given an opportunity to talk with a 
lawyer. The lack of court involvement during the whole pretrial process 
makes the system vulnerable, and the accused are often at the mercy of 
lawless investigators and examiners. Even in trials, the North Korean 
legal system, heavily reliant on an inquisitorial approach rather than 
an adversarial approach, demonstrates significant weakness in guar-
anteeing the rights of the accused.
III. punIsHment of polItIcal offenses and Kwanriso
A. Measures to Punish Political Crimes
In North Korea, political crimes are generally understood to con-
stitute anti-state and anti-nation crimes under the Criminal Act.111 
Although the law stipulates that different authorities have jurisdic-
tion, depending on the nature of the crime, it is unclear what exact 
powers those authorities have at the investigation and preliminary 
108. For more information, see infra Part III.
109. Criminal Procedure Act art. 158.
110. Id. art. 159.
111. North Korean refugees generally employ a very vague understanding of 
political crimes, broadly describing them as an offense against the state or regime. 
For example, criticizing Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jung-Il’s family or revealing secrets of 
the Kim family are considered to be examples of the crime of harming the sovereign 
authority. Printing and distributing illegal publications, disseminating rumors, and 
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examination stages. North Korean citizens greatly fear being catego-
rized as political criminals, because the Ministry of State Security is 
in charge of investigation of the crime.
Political offenses in North Korea are treated in two different ways. 
On the one hand, the North Korean criminal authorities may use the 
criminal procedure provided in the Criminal Procedure Act to punish 
political offenses such as crimes against the state and the nation. Several 
cases of alleged political offenses by non-Korean offenders known to the 
international community were tried according to North Korea’s normal 
criminal process. For example, Laura Ling and Euna Lee, Kenneth Bae, 
and Matthew Todd Miller were tried by the Supreme Court in 2009, 
2013, and 2014, respectively, for alleged political offenses.112 In the case 
of the trial and execution of Jang Song-Thaek, the Special Military 
Tribunal tried him, and he was subsequently executed in December 
2013.113 Once they go through the official trial under the criminal law, 
offenders tend to serve their sentences in a regular prison (kyohwaso).
On the other hand, many North Korean citizens who have 
allegedly committed anti-state or anti-nation offenses, and/or who 
happen to be family members of political offenders, are sent to 
special facilities called kwanriso. Those political offenders who are 
not sent to a regular prison but to kwanriso are treated in two 
different ways. Some of the principal offenders who commit seri-
ous political crimes are believed to be sent to a “completely con-
trolled area” (wanjeontongjeguyok), a closed area of a kwanriso.114 
On the other hand, those who commit minor political offenses, and 
to South Korean broadcasting—are examples of political offenses. Praising the South 
Korean regime, drug offences, trafficking in cultural heritage or antiques, circulating 
fake money, trafficking gold, defecting from the country, committing repeated border 
crossings without permission, disappearing from one’s place of residence, criticizing 
public policy, and making errors in the course of performing work duties related to 
Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jung-Il are also considered political crimes. See Aeran Lee, 
Geomijulcheoreom Chayeojin Cheje Jikimi, Kuggabouibu: Kim Young-hee Daedam 
[Web of Regime Defenders—Ministry of State Security: An Interview with Kim Young-
Hee], 252 tongIlHanguK 81 (2004). See also Kang Chol-hwan, Duidorabon je 2eui 
gohyang Yodok [Memory of My Second Hometown, Yodok] (Apr. 30, 2004), avail-
able at Yesunimeui Gyosil [Classroom of Jesus], http://cluster1.cafe.daum.net/_c21_/
bbs_search_read?grpid=ltJ&fldid=3Zb4&datanum=340&openArticle=true&docid=ltJ
3Zb434020040430143902; Lee Baek-Yong, supra note 65.
112. Choe Sang-Hun, N. Korea Sentences 2 U.S. Journalists to 12 Years of Hard 
Labor, n.y. tImes, June 8, 2009, at A7, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/08/world/
asia/08north.html; Choe Sang-Hun, North Korea Imposes Term of 15 Years on 
American, n.y. tImes, May 2, 2013, at A8, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/02/world/
asia/north-korea-sentences-american-to-15-years-of-hard-labor.html; Choe Sang-Hun, 
Matthew Todd Miller Sentenced to 6 Years of Hard Labor in North Korea, n.y. tImes, 
Sept. 15, 2014, at A4, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/15/world/asia/north-korea-
sentences-american-to-6-years-of-hard-labor.html.
113. North Korean TV Report on Trial and Execution of Jang Song Thaek (posted 
by Martyn Williams, Dec. 13, 2013), youtuBe, https://youtu.be/2SCd49pkkwk.
114. It is not clear whether a formal trial takes place before the principal offender is 
sent to the completely controlled area of a kwanriso. There has thus far been no testi-
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those who are family members of the serious political offenders 
are sent to an area called a “Special Dictatorship Area” (teukbye-
oldokjaedaesangguyeok) or “Revolutionizing Area” (hyukmyungh-
waguyok) of kwanriso without going through an actual criminal 
trial process.
Kim Kwang-Soo and Kim Eun-Chul, as stated in Part II, were 
interrogated for their alleged anti-state political crimes by prelimi-
nary examiners at the Ministry of State Security and then sent to 
the Yodok kwanriso, the 15th Camp. They were not tried in court 
for their crimes. Kang Chol-hwan and his family were sent, with-
out any investigation or examination, to the Yodok kwanriso as well, 
ultimately staying there for ten years after Kang’s grandfather was 
arrested in July 1977 for “a crime of high treason.”115
Sending political offenders and sometimes their families to the 
kwanriso is a known method of punishment for political offenses 
in North Korea. It is clear that kwanriso are used as alternative 
penal facilities that directly or indirectly punish political offenders 
and their family members. The public’s fear regarding kwanriso is 
extremely serious. They often describe these facilities as a place of 
death where unimaginable things, such as biomedical experiments, 
are freely conducted on living people.116
B. The Nature of Kwanriso
Strictly speaking, kwanriso are not prisons per se; they are com-
pletely different from regular prisons in terms of their size, shape, 
and function. Rather, they are specially controlled towns or villages 
in North Korea. Most kwanriso are under the control of the Seventh 
Bureau of the Ministry of State Security, Department of Farm 
Supervision.117 The facilities are enormous, with several villages 
within them. Kwanriso contain schools, shops, factory units, and 
even detention centers, and each one can harbor tens of thousands 
of inhabitants. Nevertheless, they function as a type of facility that 
separates people from society. They are generally located in remote, 
mountainous locations far from Pyongyang, and their economic 
conditions are miserable. The fact that a person has been sent to a 
115. See Kang cHol-HWan & pIerre rIgoulot, tHe aquarIums of pyongyang: ten 
years In tHe nortH Korean gulag (2005).
116. See Ahn Myung Cheol, Inganeui Joneomgua Kwonrireul Jikilsu Ittorok 
[To Retain Human Dignity and Human Rights], cItIzens’ all. for n. Korean 
Human rIgHts, http://kor.nkhumanrights.or.kr/kor/datacenter/related_write.
php?mode=view&bbs_idx=7579 (English version of the testimony, with the title What 
Happened in the Valley of Death?, available at http://eng.nkhumanrights.or.kr/eng/
datacenter/related_write.php?mode=view&bbs_idx=4402).
117. sHIn euIgI et al., tongIl daeBIBuKHan BeomjoIja cHeorI BanganeH KWanHan 
yongu [a study of tHe measures for nortH Korean crImInals after unIfIcatIon] 92 
(2009). See also Chang Young-gul, Ileul Neomu Jalhaeseo Japyeogada [I Was Arrested 
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kwanriso is kept secret, and neighbors often believe that he or she 
has either been executed for espionage or permanently segregated 
from the outside world. Fearful rumors about the aftermath of the 
measure often follow.
The historical origins of the kwanriso system can be traced back 
to North Korean Cabinet Decision No. 149, adopted in 1958, which 
established a special zone to admit some members of the population 
with “bad family backgrounds” (songbun), such as Japanese collabo-
rators, escapees to South Korea, and political opposition groups and 
their family members.118 It was followed by a campaign in 1967–1970 
for a new residency registration system, in which the whole popu-
lation was classified into three groups—the core class, wavering 
class, and hostile class—with fifty-one sub-categories.119 The new 
controlled zones, which were referred to as kwanriso (meaning sim-
ply “administrative camps”), were modeled after the Soviet gulag120 
and were gradually used to hold political criminals not punishable 
through normal court proceedings. Although they were not desig-
nated as prisons, kwanriso were and are effectively used as an alter-
native to prisons to deal with political offenders and their families.
According to the testimonies of people who have experienced kwan-
riso, there are still at least three currently used for political offenders 
and their families. The current status of known kwanriso is as follows:
(1) The 11th, 18th, and 22nd camps have been closed. Specifi-
cally, the 11th Kyongsung kwanriso was closed in 1989;121 
the 18th Bukchang kwanriso, which was under the supervi-
sion of the Ministry of People’s Security, was closed in 2006; 
and the 22nd Hoeryong kwanriso was closed in 2012.122
(2) The 12th and the 13th kwanriso in Onsong were closed and 
moved to the 15th Yodok.123
(3) The 25th Chongjin is often referred to as a kwanriso, but it 
is more likely to be part of the Susong kyohwaso (a regular 
prison) rather than a kwanriso.124
118. See geum-sun lee, su-am KIm & gyucHang lee, BuKHan jeongcHIBeom 
suyongso [nortH Korean polItIcal prIson camps] 17 (2013).
119. Id. at 18.
120. Id. at 12.
121. See Ahn Myung-Cheol, supra note 116.
122. See Jeon Su-Il, Bukhan Minjuhua Undongbonbu An Myong-chul 
Samuchongjang [Secretary General of NK Democratization Movements Headquarter, 
An Myong-chul], RFA (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.rfa.org/korean/weekly_program/rfa_
interview/rfainterview-03182013110327.html. See also lee, KIm & lee, supra note 
118, at 31.
123. See Ahn Myung-Cheol, supra note 116; see also Interview by Human Rights 
Watch with Mr. Lee K.Y., Seoul, S. Kor. (July 14, 2001), reported in Human rIgHts 
WatcH, supra note 1, at 25 & n.82.
124. There are reports that Susong was transformed into a kwanriso in the 1990s. 
See lee, KIm & lee, supra note 118, at 12. See also josepH s. Bermudez jr., andy dInvIlle 
& mIKe eley, comm. for Human rIgHts In n. Kor., nortH Korea camp no. 25—update 2, 
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(4) Currently, the 14th Kaechon, the 15th Yodok, and the 16th 
Hwasong kwanriso are still in operation.125
The 15th Yodok camp is well known through the testimonies 
of North Korean defectors who have had experiences there. People 
who have stayed in the 15th camp include Kim Kwang-Soo, Kim 
Eun-Cheol, Kang Chol-hwan, Kim Young-Sun, Shin Jeong-Ae, Bae 
Seung-Min, Kim Tae-Jin, Kim Myon-Suk, and Lee Baek-Yong. Kim 
Yong experienced the 14th Kaechon camp.126 Shin Dong-Hyuk testi-
fied that he was born in the 14th camp, but he later revised his tes-
timony, stating that he was not in the 14th camp, but in the 18th 
camp.127 Ahn Myung-Cheol testified that he had experienced the 
11th Kyongsung, the 13th Onsung, and the 22nd Hoiryong camps as 
a guard of the state security agency.128
Life in administrative camps is generally focused on work. 
The residents in a camp become members of a workers’ unit. It 
is known that there are three different degrees of facilities (first, 
second, and third, in descending order of severity), “although all 
are labor facilities that do not allow people to move inside or out-
side freely.”129 The inhabitants in the first- and second-degree 
facilities are called “fixed inmates” (kkochibeom),130 meaning that 
they cannot move out of the facilities. While labor is still hard 
in the third-degree camps, men and women can marry and live 
together, unmarried women and elderly people can stay home and 
cultivate gardens, and children can go to school.131 The village 
facilities are divided into family units and single units. In family 
units, children are allowed to attend school. Not all family mem-
bers are sent to the same unit. A principal offender who has com-
mitted serious political crimes might be sent to a kwanriso alone, 
separated from his or her family members. The family members 
might then be sent to a family unit in a different kwanriso. The 
family members may also be reunited after spending some time 
125. See Ahn Myung-Cheol, supra note 116. The 16th Hwasong is also 
known as Myonggan. In 2013, David Hawk reported that the Hwasong kwan-
riso had been renamed “Myonggan.” davId HaWK, comm. for Human rIgHts In 
n. Kor., nortH Korea’s HIdden gulag: InterpretIng reports of cHanges In tHe 
prIson camps 21 (2013), https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/NKHiddenGulag_
DavidHawk.pdf. It is not clear whether the name of Hwasung-gun, which was 
renamed from Myonggan-gun in 1981, was again returned to its old name, 
Myonggan-gun.
126. See nat’l Human rIgHts comm’n of Kor., 2012 compIlatIon of nortH Korean 
Human rIgHts vIolatIons (2012). See also lee, KIm & lee, supra note 118.
127. Anna Fifield, Prominent N. Korean Defector Shin Dong-hyuk Admits Parts of 
Story Are Inaccurate, WasH. post (Jan. 17, 2015), http://wpo.st/9JJT2.
128. See Ahn Myung-Cheol, supra note 116.
129. Interview by Human Rights Watch with Mr. Lee M. in Seoul, S. Kor. (July 13, 
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in a kwanriso.132 They may be transferred to other facilities or set 
free to live in villages on the outskirts of these camps.
The reason kwanriso function as a sanctioning mechanism in 
lieu of prisons is because the working units, municipal governments, 
and administrative institutions work in close cooperation to sus-
tain the social system. Under the North Korean social control sys-
tem, food, housing, work, education, and medical services are closely 
tied to the locality of the residents, and thus the inmates of a kwan-
riso cannot but suffer from serious persecution, discrimination, and 
harsh treatment. Travel control systems, food rationing systems, and 
the production and distribution systems of society are coordinated 
with the goal of societal control. Food is distributed every other week; 
without a ration, nobody can survive in this system. A person in 
North Korea can survive only when he or she is fully incorporated 
into the party system and municipal administrative institutions, 
which provide food, accommodations, and other resources to live on. 
Education and medical services are fully controlled by the govern-
ment and the party. The government decides where each person will 
live, and the place of residence is strictly controlled through state 
ID or certification of Pyongyang residency.133 To make a trip beyond 
city limits, citizens are required to obtain travel permits.134 Since the 
municipal government does not provide food for travelers, they must 
carry their own food. Travel without a permit is considered a crimi-
nal offense.135 Once a Pyongyang citizen commits a serious crime, the 
person’s Pyongyang citizenship certificate is revoked.136 He or she 
will subsequently be expelled to a rural area designated by the party 
and the state. Because of the residency registration system, travel 
permit system, and other social control mechanisms, once the state 
orders a political offender and his or her family members to move 
from one place to another, this order must be followed. Thus, the 
notion of a right to freedom of movement and travel in North Korea 
is meaningless. Once a person is forced to move from Pyongyang, for 
example, to a mining village in the Hamkyung Province, his living 
standards may be as poor as if he were in prison, because he will lose 
all of the trappings of civilization previously enjoyed while living in 
132. Kim Yong met his mother in the 18th Bukchang kwanriso after he was moved 
from the 14th Kaechon kwanriso. Interview with Kim Yong in Seoul, S. Kor. (July 23, 
2001).
133. See Gongmindeungrokbeop [Citizen Registration Act], amended and sup-
plemented by Decree No. 1676 of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, 
July 24, 2010, art. 7; Sudo Pyongayangsi Guanribeop [Capitol Pyongyang Control 
Act], amended and supplemented by Decree No. 743 of the Presidium of the Supreme 
People’s Assembly, Mar. 30, 2010, art. 32.
134. See geumsun lee, BuKHanjumIneuI geojuIdong [cHanges of resIdency In nortH 
Korea] 37–39 (2007).
135. Inminboandansokbeob [People’s Security Control Act], July 26, 2005, art. 30. 
See lee, supra note 134, at 40.
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Pyongyang and will likely struggle to survive as he is forced to go in 
search of food.
The way the accused are arrested and sent to a kwanriso is also 
a traumatic experience. Kang Chol-hwan, who was sent to the 15th 
Yodok camp, stated in his book, The Aquariums of Pyongyang, that 
he and his family members were abruptly arrested by the Ministry of 
State Security in 1977 without prior notification or appropriate pro-
cedure.137 They were forcefully transferred to the kwanriso without 
being either interrogated or directly investigated, and were simply 
told that they were being sent to Yodok because Kang’s grandfa-
ther, a former leader of the pro-Pyongyang Federation of Korean 
Residents in Japan, had committed a political crime. Kang’s family 
lived there for ten years. Those people sent to a kwanriso either for 
their own crimes or for the wrongful political acts of their family are 
forced to believe that they should be blamed for the crimes or the 
acts. Their only hope is that they may be released or transferred to 
another place after serving some time, just as if they were serving a 
prison sentence.
People sent to a kwanriso are called “move-ins” (ijumin) to dif-
ferentiate them from those who came to live in the town because 
of their “economic wrongdoing such as fraud or theft,” who are 
referred to as “residents” (daenaemin).138 Authorities discrimi-
nate against the move-ins by paying subsidies, called “money 
awards for residents” (daenaegageupkeum), only to the resident 
members.139 Unlike the residents, the move-ins are required to 
call the Ministry of State Security officers in charge of the kwan-
riso administration “sir” (sunsaengnim). They also bow deeply to 
the officers when they meet them. In the camps, the move-ins are 
absolutely subordinate to all others within the camp’s hierarchi-
cal system. Because of the camp’s different way of treating them, 
the move-ins in the camps virtually live as if they are prisoners. 
Interestingly, in the now-closed 18th Bukchang kwanriso, which 
was under the control of the Ministry of People’s Security, many of 
the move-ins chose not to leave the towns after they finished their 
terms. They settled in nearby places in the camp, and continued 
to live in the area, being known in these places as “the released” 
(haejemin).
It is obvious from all of the characteristics described above that 
the kwanriso are facilities that hold political offenders and their 
families as an alternative to prison. They are a unique way of con-
trolling the people in North Korea that should be understood broadly, 
in conjunction with the limitations on mobility and the lack of free-
dom of movement.
137. See Kang & Rigoulot, supra note 115, at 32.
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Moreover, many political offenders are sent to a kwanriso and 
subjected to harsh treatment under the control of the Ministry of 
State Security for a prolonged period of time.140 This is as harsh as a 
criminal punishment—it is undoubtedly a serious violation of human 
rights. The Criminal Act and Criminal Procedure Act prioritize social 
education measures over criminal punishments, as if such measures 
do the offenders a favor. However, the practice of sending minor 
political offenders and even their families to a remote place where 
harsh treatment is guaranteed cannot be legally justified. It is in fact 
abusive because, under the name of social education measures, this 
nonjudicial punishment may be imposed on both the offender and his 
or her entire family. To make matters worse, the term of stay in a 
kwanriso is usually not predetermined. The criminals are completely 
isolated from the outside world and forced to perform intensive labor. 
Therefore, enforced stay in a kwanriso is a truly harsh extrajudicial 
punishment. Even when a person lives as “the released” (haejemin) 
in the camp after serving several years, relatives and friends still 
have no way of knowing where he or she is. In this way, the great 
chilling effects of the administrative camps have lasting effects.
C. The Procedure for Sending an Offender to a Kwanriso
A substantial number of people in kwanriso were sent there 
because they allegedly violated the provisions of anti-state or anti-
nation laws under the Criminal Act.141 Kim Kwang-Soo was sent 
to the 15th Yodok camp without trial. In fact, he admitted that he 
had committed a serious political crime that could be punishable 
by death or another serious sentence. However, he was told that he 
was given the lenient treatment of being sent to Yodok instead of 
prison because his friend worked in the Ministry of State Security.142 
Of course, there have been cases in which the family members of 
140. North Korea considers time spent in a kwanriso as punishment. See 
BeoBtujaengBumun IlKKundeuleuluIHan cHamgoseo [mInIstry of people’s securIty, 
manual for laW enforcement offIcers] 375 (2009).
141. For example, the International Coalition to Stop Crimes Against Humanity 
in North Korea released a list of 254 Yodok inhabitants, whose offenses are as fol-
lows: attempted defections (64); espionage, anti-state activities, or leaking national 
secrets (47); infringement of the authority of the Party or attempted anti-state activi-
ties (47); guilt by family association (29); and anti-revolutionary expressions or criti-
cisms of the regime (25). See Buk Yodok suyongso Sugamja 254 myeong Myueogdan 
Gonggae [The List of the 254 Inmates in Yodok in North Korea], nK cHosun (Jan. 26, 
2010), http://nk.chosun.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=122561.
142. See Kim Gwang-Soo, supra note 27. They told Kim Kwang-Soo that he was 
sent to Yodok instead of prison thanks to the favorable consideration of the Dear 
Leader Kim Jong-Il. Similar testimony was given by Ahn Hyuk, who said that he 
was sent to the “Revolutionizing Area” of Yodok for three years after being told, 
“You have been sent to the Revolutionizing Area, being favored by the Dear Leader’s 
decision even though you have committed a crime punishable by death.” See KIm 
soo-am, BuKHaneuI HyungsaBeoBjesang HyungsacHeorIjeolcHaWa jeogyongsIltae 
[Penal process and actual practIce under tHe nortH Korean crImInal laW system] 
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offenders were sent to a kwanriso based on guilt by association with-
out even knowing the actual crimes of the principal offender.143
The legal grounds for sending somebody to a kwanriso are not 
at all transparent. Nor are they clear with regard to the role of pros-
ecutors and other organs of the Ministry of State Security in the 
decision-making process before the accused is sent to a kwanriso 
without trial.
Testimonies of defectors suggest that a decision to send a politi-
cal offender to kwanriso results from the broad collaboration of many 
state agencies. It is fair to say that the highest authority in making 
the decision to send a political offender to a kwanriso is the Korean 
Workers’ Party.144 In addition, there are two important bodies in the 
decision-making process: the Security Committee (anjeonwiwonhoi) 
and the Executive Committee (jibhaengwiwonhoi).145
Kim Yong, who worked for the predecessor of the current 
Ministry of State Security, asserted that Gye Eung-tae, the Secretary 
of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party in charge of 
judiciary affairs, was the person responsible for endorsing decisions 
to send individuals to kwanriso.146 He added that important matters 
could go up to Kim Jung-Il for approval.147
Even though there are no formal court proceedings, the poten-
tial political offenders go through a systematic decision-making pro-
cess through the Security Committee and Executive Committee.148 
The process begins with the investigation and preliminary examina-
tion conducted by the Ministry of State Security. A suspect is first 
Gaeipgua Gyoyuk [North Korean Human Rights in a Country with a Cooperative but 
Hostile Relationship: Interference and Education], je 9HoI BuKHanIngWon, nanmIn 
guKjeHoIeuI [tHe 9tH InternatIonal conference on nortH Korean Human rIgHts & 
refugees, mar. 20–21, 2009] 12–41, http://www.dailynk.com/korean//bbs/download.
php?uid=2678&imgDate=20090320&bbs_code=bbsIdx2.
143. See Kang & rIgoulot, supra note 115.
144. See Interview with Kim Yong, supra note 132.
145. See Aeran Lee, supra note 111. See also Kim Yong, supra note 132.
146. Interview with Kim Yong, supra note 132.
147. Id.
148. According to the testimony of Kim Yong, who worked for the Ministry of State 
Security and spent time in the 14th Kaechon kwanriso, the procedure to send a per-
son to an administrative camp is as follows:
First, the Ministry of State Security prepares the documents. Then the 
Executive Committee—a group consisting of people in uniforms with “big 
stars”—deliberates and makes the decision. The Executive Committee mem-
bers include the head of the Third Department of the Supreme Prosecutors’ 
Office. Then the Secretary of Judicial Affairs of the Workers’ Party observes 
and ratifies the decision.
See Interview with Kim Yong, supra note 132. Another defector, Kim Young-Hee, who 
also worked at the Ministry of State Security, testified that the Executive Committee 
consists of the prosecutor from the central office of the Ministry of State Security, the 
provincial or city chief of the Ministry of State Security, the chief of the Department 
of Counterespionage, the head of the Department of Intelligence Analysis, and the 
supervising agent of the case. See Aeran Lee, supra note 111. Both Kim Yong and 
Kim Young-Hee are referring to the same institution, and they both have a similar 
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brought before the Department of Counterespionage (bantamguk) 
of the Ministry of State Security.149 Then, he or she is investigated 
and examined by the investigators and preliminary examiners of 
the Ministry of State Security.150 Under the Criminal Procedure Act, 
prosecutors should make a decision as to whether to prosecute the 
case for criminal punishment after concluding the preliminary exam-
ination. It has been widely testified by many defectors that, at the 
conclusion of the preliminary examination, they met a prosecutor 
from the prosecution department of the Ministry of State Security. 
Prosecutors are responsible for supervising the investigation and 
the preliminary examination, and they make the decision whether to 
indict a suspect through the regular judiciary process.
According to testimonies, when the preliminary examination 
of a case is being completed, behind the scenes a meeting of the 
Security Committee (anjeonwiwonhoi) is convened in the Ministry 
of State Security to make a decision as to whether to make a rec-
ommendation for the political offender to be sent to a kwanriso in 
lieu of criminal prosecution.151 Then the Executive Committee (jib-
haengwiwonhoi)—consisting of the prosecutor from the central 
office of the Ministry of State Security, the Provincial or City Chief 
of the Ministry of State Security, the Chief of the Department of 
Counterespionage, the head of the Department of Intelligence 
Analysis, and the supervising agent of the case—meet to set the 
degree of punishment and the measures to be taken.152 The deci-
sion will be endorsed by the Secretary of the Central Committee of 
the Korean Workers’ Party in charge of judiciary affairs.153 In short, 
there is no formal judicial decision-making procedure to send a 
political offender to a kwanriso. Rather, they are mostly under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of State Security and are sent to such 
facilities by ad-hoc decision-making bodies: the Security Committee 
and the Executive Committee.
This decision-making mechanism to send a person to a kwan-
riso is quite different from the troika system of the gulag (Main 
Camp Administration) in Stalinist Russia154 and the court-based 
Reeducation Through Labor system in China.155 It is very troubling 
that a decision to subject a political offender to criminal punish-
ment is made without going through any judicial process. The non-
judicial law enforcement agencies and political institutions make 
149. See Interview with Kim Yong, supra note 132; Aeran Lee, supra note 111. See 
also supreme court of Kor., offIce of court admIn., supra note 26.
150. See Interview with Kim Yong, supra note 132; Aeran Lee, supra note 111.
151. See Interview with Kim Yong, supra note 132; Aeran Lee, supra note 111.
152. See Aeran Lee, supra note 111.
153. See Interview with Kim Yong, supra note 132.
154. See anne appleBaum, gulag: a HIstory (2004).
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judicial-like decisions without guaranteeing the necessary substan-
tive and procedural due process. It is also problematic that they 
decide the fates of families based on a guilt-by-association system.
If a person is charged with serious political crimes, a formal trial 
in court is probable, in which case a regular sentence may be ren-
dered. However, for minor political offenses, the principal offenders 
and possibly their family members are subject to the decisions of the 
Security Committee and the Executive Committee. No case record or 
transcripts are made available for the affected party, and the terms 
of the detention or “revolutionizing” period are not clearly set out, 
nor are they properly communicated.156 However, once individuals 
are sent to a kwanriso, the offenders and their family members are 
treated as political criminals or betrayers of the Fatherland.
D. Social Education and Criminal Punishment
It is especially frustrating that there is no provision in the 
Criminal Act and the Criminal Procedure Act justifying any crimi-
nal punishment of offenders by kwanriso. The Criminal Act of 1974 
had a provision that the adult family members of military person-
nel who fled to a foreign country would be expelled to remote areas 
for up to five years, along with the forfeiture of their licenses.157 
This provision is good evidence that the North Korean crimi-
nal system used the segregation of offenders’ families in places 
like kwanriso as a form of criminal punishment, based on guilt 
by association. However, the provision disappeared in the 1987 
Criminal Act. Furthermore, there is no provision in the Criminal 
Act or Criminal Procedure Act regarding the use of the Security 
Committee and Executive Committee to determine punishments for 
minor political offenders.
It is natural for readers to ask whether there is any occasion 
when North Korean legal authority can stop following regular crimi-
nal procedure. Is there any legal avenue in the criminal law that 
allows the law enforcement agencies to pursue an alternative non-
judicial procedure in order to send offenders and their families to a 
kwanriso in lieu of going through the criminal procedure?
A clue is found in the criminal law provisions dealing with 
social education measures. Both the Criminal Act and the Criminal 
Procedure Act provide that the state should primarily rely on social 
156. For example, Kim Eun-Cheol was told that his term was three years for 
crimes of betrayal against the Fatherland by the chief of the Political Department of 
the 15th Yodok camp only after he was sent to the facility. See Kim Eun-Cheol, supra 
note 30.
157. Hyongbeob [Criminal Act], amended and supplemented by Decision of the 
Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly, Dec. 19, 1974, art. 70. See 
Dong-Hee Park, Bukhan Hyeongbeop-Teukhi Inkwohnchimhae gyujeongeul jun-
gsimeuro [The North Korean Criminal Act: Focusing on the Human-Rights Violating 
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education rather than legal sanctions in dealing with criminals. 
Article 3 of the 2012 Criminal Act and article 2 of the 2012 Criminal 
Procedure Act provide that the state should “primarily rely on social 
education, which can be combined with legal sanctions.”158 In other 
words, North Korean penal policy prefers social education measures 
rather than regular criminal procedure.
In fact, the 2004 amendments of the Criminal Act expanded the 
preexisting article 11 provision on social education into two provi-
sions,159 which were retained in the 2012 Criminal Act as articles 50 
and 51.160 The provisions allow adult offenders to be treated by social 
education measures if a prosecutor, judge, or court finds that such 
measures would work, having regard for the degree of repentance 
and the danger of the crime.161 There is a catch, however, in that if 
an offender treated by social education measures commits another 
crime, the person will be punished by aggregated punishments for 
the old crime as well as the new crime.162
Also in 2004, the Criminal Procedure Act expanded the pro-
visions regarding social education measures by creating a new 
chapter with eight new articles. The contents of these provisions 
survived several subsequent amendments, and the current Criminal 
Procedure Act (2012) still has them in chapter 10 (articles 115–122). 
The Criminal Procedure Act (2012) stipulates quite detailed infor-
mation about the imposition of social education measures, such 
as the grounds for social education,163 the procedure for social edu-
cation measures to be applied,164 the status of a person subject to 
such measures,165 and the supervisor in charge of social education 
158. Hyongbeob [Criminal Act], May 14, 2012, art. 3; Hyongsasosongbeob 
[Criminal Procedure Act], May 14, 2012, art. 2.
159. See Hyongbeob [Criminal Act], Apr. 29, 2004, arts. 49–50.
160. Hyongbeob [Criminal Act], May 14, 2012, arts. 50–51.
161. Article 50 (Social Education Measures) of the 2012 Criminal Act, id., pro-
vides: “If a minor committed a crime, or even if an adult committed a crime, if it is 
determined, upon considering the degree of repentance and the danger of the crime, 
that he can be rehabilitated through social education, then a social education meas-
ure can be imposed.”
162. Id. art. 51.
163. Criminal Procedure Act art. 115 (Grounds for Applying Social Education 
Measures): “Social education measures shall be imposed in the following circum-
stances: (1) when a person who has reached the age of 14 but has not reached the age 
of 17 committed a crime; [or] (2) when it is determined that a criminal can be reedu-
cated without imposing criminal punishment.”
164. Id. art. 116 (Procedure for Social Education Measures):
A prosecutor, a judge, or a court shall, when the grounds set forth in article 
115 of this Law is found, proceed as follows:
(1)  a prosecutor shall impose a social education measure upon the 
approval of a superior Prosecutors’ Office;
(2)  a judge or a court shall decide and sentence the defendant to a social 
education measure.
165. Id. art. 119 (Status of a Person Subject to a Social Education Measure): “A 
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measures.166 It is unclear what triggered these changes to the provi-
sions on social education, but it is certainly related to the efforts of 
the North Korean government to make its criminal law more regi-
mented after receiving international criticism over human rights.
The principle of prioritizing social education over punish-
ment indicates that North Korea wants to reduce criminalization 
by increasing the opportunity for criminals to return to society. 
However, the social education measures function as a way to punish 
crimes or socially deviant behaviors by circumventing criminal pro-
cedure. Local administration and law enforcement agencies continue 
to supervise those released after social education. As noted above, if 
they commit a crime during the period of prescription, they can be 
punished for both the past offenses and the new act.
It is noteworthy that the People’s Security Control Act and the 
Administrative Punishment Act also have provisions emphasiz-
ing social education measures as the primary means to fight crime, 
either alone or in combination with legal sanctions.167
The People’s Security Control Act deals with the activities of the 
Ministry of People’s Security in regulating social security, and dem-
onstrates the actual implementation of nonjudicial punishment. This 
Act includes a wide range of politically and socially deviant behaviors 
such as acts disrupting public order or threatening national political 
security in chapter 2 (articles 8 through 40), for which social educa-
tion measures can be approved.168 Article 54 of the People’s Security 
Control Act emphasizes the need to take into consideration “the pos-
sibility of rehabilitation and the degree of risk of the crime” during the 
process of determining the appropriate adminstrative punishments.169 
In particular, article 57 of the Act provides that the Executive Council 
of the Ministry of People’s Security (inminboangiguan chaegimil-
gun hyeobeuihoi) must review the offender’s record of offences and 
can make decisions regarding his or her punishment, such as reform 
through labor, suspension of the offender’s license, reduction of the 
offender’s salary, revocation of the offender’s license, suspension of 
operation, confiscation of the offender’s property, or social education 
measures.170 This is very similar to how political offenders are treated 
via the Security Committee and the Executive Committee.171
166. Id. art. 120 (Supervisor in Charge of the Social Education Measure): “An institu-
tion, enterprise, organization, or village (town, district, or neighborhood) in which the 
person subject to a social education measure resides shall take charge of the education.”
167. Inminboandansogbeob [People’s Security Control Act], July 26, 2005, art. 5; 
Hangjeongcheobeolbeob [Administrative Punishment Act], amended and supple-
mented by Decree No. 1902 of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, Oct. 
16, 2011, art. 3.
168. People’s Security Control Act arts. 8–40.
169. Id. art. 54.
170. Id. art. 57.
171. Decisions on the treatment of political offenders are made by the Security 
Committee and the Executive Committee. See Aeran Lee, supra note 111. See also 
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The Administrative Punishment Act was first enacted in 2004, to 
authorize administrative sanctions against institutions and individu-
als when the offenses are not serious enough to be considered crimes.172 
Chapter 3 of the Act (as amended in 2011) designates 195 types of 
illegal acts as offenses punishable by administrative sanctions. They 
include not attending work sites for more than one month without jus-
tifiable reason (article 90) and listening to the broadcasting of enemy 
states (article 153). The list of crimes is enormous, and includes offenses 
against the defense management order (articles 34–48), offenses against 
the economic management order (articles 49–131), offenses against the 
cultural management order (articles 132–157), offenses against the gen-
eral administrative order (articles 158–186), and offenses against com-
munity order (articles 187–228). Administrative sanctions and decisions 
provided for in the Act include punishments in the form of a warning 
or serious warning; unpaid labor or reform through labor; lowering of 
the offender’s rank, dismissal of the offender from his or her position, 
or removal of the position; fines; suspension of operation; order for 
payment of damages; confiscation of property; and suspension of the 
offender’s license, reduction of salary, or revocation of the offender’s 
license.173 Administrative punishments for offenses violating the Act 
can be imposed by the Socialist Legal Life Supervision Committee, the 
Cabinet, prosecutors, courts, mediation, a people’s security institutions, 
a supervisory institution, or other relevant institutions, enterprises, and 
organizations.174
The People’s Security Control Act, along with the Administrative 
Punishment Act, demonstrates that various crimes and offenses not 
punishable by regular criminal law and judicial process are alterna-
tively punished through nonjudicial measures. These two Acts are 
used to punish relatively minor cases not through court proceedings, 
but based on the decisions of administrative agencies.175 In contrast 
to regular criminal punishments under the Criminal Act, punish-
ments implemented under the People’s Security Act or other laws are 
nonjudicial criminal punishments.
While the list of punishments under the Administrative 
Punishment Act and the People’s Security Act has expanded, there 
are still many areas in which the legal agencies can use social educa-
tion measures. Even when a given offense is not punishable either 
172. The purpose of the Administrative Punishment Act is stated in article 1 as 
follows: “This Act aims at preventing illegal activities by strictly setting up the insti-
tution and order for implementing administrative punishment, contributing to the 
establishment of a law-abiding socialist culture.”
173. Hangjeongcheobeolbeob [Administrative Punishment Act], Oct. 16, 2011, art. 14.
174. Id. art. 229.
175. See Inminboandansokbeob [People’s Security Control Act], July 26, 2005, art. 
57. This provision provides that if an offense is serious enough to be punished under 
the Administrative Punishment Act, the case should be referred to the Socialist Legal 
Life Supervision Committee, and if the case needs to be criminally tried by legal pro-
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by criminal sanctions under the Criminal Act or by sanctions pro-
vided for under the Administrative Punishment Act or the People’s 
Security Act, the law enforcement agencies can still rely on social 
education measures.
Social education measures were originally designed to reduce 
harsh criminal punishments, but in reality they seem to function 
as an extension of nonjudicial punishment for minor offenses, even 
when criminal punishment or administrative punishment is not nec-
essary. The law stipulates that social education measures are not 
considered criminal punishments. However, social education mea-
sures can be a trap, given that if the person commits a new crime 
within the prescription period, the punishment could be doubled. 
It is likely that a similar rationale is being used to punish political 
offenders by sending them to kwanriso.
Examining how social education measures are decided and 
implemented under the law is useful in understanding how politi-
cal offenders are treated.176 Article 120 of the Criminal Procedure 
Act provides that the institution, enterprise, or organization 
to which the criminal belongs or the county in which he resides 
may take charge of the execution of a social education measure. 
Article 36 of the Prosecution Supervision Act stipulates: “If a 
prosecutor intends to reeducate a person who has violated the 
law of the country, he may transfer the person to the Socialist 
Legal Life Supervision Committee (sahoijueui beobmusaengh-
wal jidowiwonhoi) or recommend that a relevant institution, 
enterprise, or organization initiate a public punishment move-
ment.”177 The Execution of Sentence and Punishment Act pro-
vides that the execution of judgment for social education will 
be the responsibility of the institution, enterprise, or organiza-
tion that receives the copy of the court’s decision and notice of 
176. The decision-making process is explained in the Criminal Procedure Act and 
People’s Security Control Act. A prosecutor can impose social education measures 
upon the approval of a higher-level Prosecutors’ Office in cases where the crime was 
committed by a minor who has reached the age of fourteen but has not yet reached 
the age of seventeen, or if it is determined that the accused may be reeducated and 
reformed without punishment. When prosecutors, judges, courts, or people’s security 
agencies decide to impose a social education measure, the administrative institution, 
enterprise, or group to which the offender belongs or the county where the offender 
resides is responsible for taking charge of the social education of the offender. See 
Hyongsasosongbeob [Criminal Procedure Act], May 14, 2012, arts. 115–20. When 
the Ministry of People’s Security takes measures against offenders, it must be done 
based on various depositions, evidence, and applicable certification documents, and 
the time limit for handling offenders is thirty days from the finding of the offense. 
Offenders may be transferred to the Ministry of People’s Security in the region that 
they are from or to their place of work; in the case of minor offenses, the Ministry of 
People’s Security may unilaterally direct the social education measure. The Ministry 
of People’s Security can also achieve comprehensive cooperation by submitting “a 
general written or oral opinion to the institution, the enterprise or the organization.” 
See People’s Security Control Act arts. 41–53.
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conviction.178 Since a kwanriso functions as a special work unit or 
institution, the administrative body of a kwanriso seems to have 
a similar responsibility and authority to impose social educa-
tion measures, often called a process of “revolutionizing” political 
offenders.
One issue that is still unclear is whether a prosecutor or a judge 
has the power to make a decision to send a criminal to kwanriso on 
their own, just as they can decide to send an ordinary criminal to 
be reeducated under the name of social education.179 As discussed 
above, the decision-making process seems far more complicated than 
an individual prosecutor or judge’s decision, because the Security 
Committee and the Executive Committee are the actual decision-
making bodies. Nevertheless, they are still influenced by the penal 
policy of North Korea that prioritizes social education measures over 
legal sanctions.
It is likely that in North Korea, when the state finds that normal 
judicial punishments are inappropriate, either because the offense 
in question is by nature a nonjusticiable political act or because it is 
so minor that it is not punishable by regular criminal adjudication, 
they use nonjudicial methods of punishment that could be viewed as 
other forms of social education. This is possible because the Criminal 
Act and Criminal Procedure Act allow prosecutors, judges, and courts 
to decide not to lay a criminal charge or issue a sentence but instead 
to send the offender to social education. This means that the Workers’ 
Party and other governmental institutions, as well as the Ministry of 
State Security can take part in making a nonjudicial decision to punish 
offenders and their family members by sending them to a kwanriso. If 
the Security Committee and Executive Committee convene to make a 
decision, they can easily override the authority of a prosecutor to indict 
a case. Prosecutors will probably delegate their authority to supervise 
the social reeducation process to the administrative body of a kwan-
riso as they do in the case of ordinary crimes with the Socialist Legal 
Life Supervision Committee or the Comrade Judgment Commission.180 
In this way, the Ministry of State Security could technically be consid-
ered as overseeing the social reeducation process of the offenders. The 
Administrative Punishment Act and the People’s Security Control Act 
also serve a similar function in providing the legal authority to send 
the political offender to alternative facilities. Once law enforcement 
agencies identify an anti-state or anti-nation offense, they may jointly 
work with the Ministry of State Security to determine how to deal with 
the principal offenders and their family members.
178. Pangyeolpanjeon Jibhaengbeob [Execution of Sentence and Punishment Act], 
Nov. 19, 1998, arts. 29–38.
179. Criminal Procedure Act, May 14, 2012, art. 120.
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Iv. strategIes for cHanges
The practice of sending political offenders and their family mem-
bers to kwanriso without appropriate judicial process is clearly in 
violation of international human rights law. For example, Article 9(1) 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
states: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. 
No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and 
in accordance with such procedure as are established by law.”181 
Article 8(3)(a) provides: “No one shall be required to perform forced 
or compulsory labour.”182 The practice of punishing political offend-
ers through nonjudicial means by sending them to a kwanriso is defi-
nitely in violation of the ICCPR. It is also in violation of the right 
to liberty of movement and to the freedom to choose one’s residence 
in the same Covenant.183 The treatment of the “move-ins” in a kwan-
riso also constitutes a serious human rights violation, which could 
amount to a crime of persecution.184
The UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North 
Korea (COI) submitted its findings to the Human Rights Council on 
February 7, 2014, asserting that “[s]ystematic, widespread and gross 
human rights violations have been, and are being, committed by 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, its institutions and offi-
cials.”185 The COI Report proposed that “[t]he United Nations must 
ensure that those most responsible for the crimes against human-
ity committed in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are held 
accountable,” and that the measures taken in that regard “should be 
combined with a reinforced human rights dialogue, the promotion of 
incremental change through more people-to-people contact and an 
inter-Korean agenda for reconciliation.”186 The COI Report seems 
to place the greatest emphasis on the accountability of the regime 
rather than on the promotion and protection of human rights, a fact 
which has prompted North Korea to strongly denounce the report.187 
The criticisms should definitely be combined with efforts to make 
actual and incremental changes in the country.
Some may question whether there is any hope for a shift to a 
legal system that protects human rights in North Korea under the 
181. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 
S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
182. Id. art. 8(3)(a).
183. Id. art. 12.
184. Under Article 7(1)(h) and 7(2)(g) of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1002 (1998), 2187 U.N.T.S. 3, persecution is 
a crime against humanity, and is defined as “the intentional and severe deprivation 
of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the 
group or collectivity.”
185. Rep. of the Comm., supra note 6, ¶ 1211.
186. Id. ¶ 1218.
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current regime. It should be remembered that similar skepticism 
existed with regard to Russia and China. In fact, North Korea is 
following the example of China’s legal changes, even if the speed is 
slow. Specifically, North Korea amended its Constitution in 2009 to 
incorporate an expression of respect for human rights, thus follow-
ing the Chinese path. Article 8 of the amended Constitution now 
provides that “the State shall defend the interests of the workers, 
peasants and working intellectuals and respect and protect their 
human rights.” In the same vein, in 2006, the Criminal Procedure 
Act of North Korea added article 5, which provides: “The State 
should thoroughly protect human rights in dealing with criminal 
cases.”188 In the Universal Periodic Review conducted by the UN 
Human Rights Council in May 2014, North Korea adopted a signifi-
cant amount of the recommendations by the international commu-
nity, in contrast to its previous flat rejection in 2009.189
In terms of normative development, it is not exceptional for 
North Korea to have begun introducing human rights in its legal 
system. Risse and Sikkink, using their “spiral model” argument, 
describe the process of human rights development as gradual. They 
explain that the development of human rights and democracy hap-
pens in gradual phases of repression, denial, tactical concession, pre-
scriptive status, and rule-consistent behavior.190 Apparently North 
Korea cannot continue its total repression and denial stages, and it 
will need to move toward a system of human rights protection.
What is the best way to promote and protect human rights 
in North Korea? It is difficult to identify a single effective way to 
promote human rights in the country. Marzuki Darusman, the 
former UN Special Rapporteur on North Korean human rights, pri-
oritized humanitarian issues over civil and political rights viola-
tions when he was first appointed in 2007. This was a somewhat 
different approach from that of his predecessor, Vitit Muntarbhorn. 
Muntarbhorn’s emphasis was on North Korea’s violations of civil and 
political rights,191 but Darusman initially tried to engage with North 
Korea, which seems to have resulted in a change in the approach to 
the COI Report.192
188. It is included as article 6 in the current Hyongsasosongbeob [Criminal 
Procedure Act], May 14, 2012.
189. North Korea has accepted nearly half of the 268 recommendations for change 
that arose in the review. See Louis Charbonneau, U.N. Sees Signs of North Korea 
Softening in Human Rights Dialogue, Reuters (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.reuters.
com/article/us-northkorea-rights-un-idUSKBN0IH25M20141028.
190. See Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International 
Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction, in tHe poWer of Human 
rIgHts: InternatIonal norms and domestIc cHange 1, 20–35 (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 
1999).
191. See Vitit Muntarbhorn (Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human 
Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea), Report to the General Assembly, 
U.N. Doc. A/60/306 (Aug. 29, 2005).
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During the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations 
in South Korea, the governments pursued an engagement policy. In 
particular, Kim Dae-Jung’s so-called Sunshine Policy, which was an 
appeasement policy toward North Korea as a method for change, was 
internationally known.193 However, it is true that, under their lenient 
policies, the Kim and Roh governments were less active with respect 
to human rights issues in North Korea: they refused to participate in 
the adoption of the UN resolutions on North Korean human rights, 
and it was only in 2006 that the Roh Moo-Hyun administration voted 
in favor of such a resolution for the first time at the UN General 
Assembly.194 The reason for their hesitation in raising human rights 
issues in North Korea was because they worried that direct human 
rights criticism against the regime might restrict opportunities 
for the South to continue its engagement and cooperation with the 
North.195 This approach was widely criticized by conservative groups 
in South Korea and the international community. In fact, the idea 
that human rights critiques of North Korea would jeopardize the 
South Korean government’s cooperative relationship with the North 
has not been proven.
European states took a different approach when they normalized 
diplomatic relations with North Korea in 2000. The EU and some 
European nations demanded that human rights should be on the 
agenda in the dialogue on normalization,196 and the North Korean 
government agreed to include it as a main agenda item in the nego-
tiations with Europe.197 The North Korean regime cannot disregard 
193. See Chung-in Moon, The Sunshine Policy and the Korean Summit: 
Assessments and Prospects, in tHe future of nortH Korea 26 (Tsuneo Akaha ed., 
2001).
194. Mincheol Kim & Hawon Lee, Woigyobu, UN Bukhan Inkwon Gyeoleuian 
Chansung [Ministry of Foreign Affairs “Voted for UN Resolution for Human Rights 
in North Korea”], cHosun IlBo (Nov. 17, 2006), http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_
dir/2006/11/17/2006111760068.html.
195. For example, Kim Dae-Jung tried to defend the Sunshine Policy as a form of 
human rights policy. When he and his North Korean policy aides were criticized by 
conservative blocs, he rebutted them by saying that offering food aid to North Korea 
was one of the most important human rights protection activities. See Haetbyeot 
Jeongchaekeun Bukhaneui Inkwongua Minjuhua Silhyeoneui Gili Doieotta [Sunshine 
Policy Served as a Road to Realizing Human Rights and Democratization in North 
Korea], plus Korea tImes (Nov. 24, 2006), http://www.pluskorea.net/sub_read.
html?uid=1434.
196. See tHe ec–democratIc people’s repuBlIc of Korea (dprK) country strategy 
paper 2001–2004, at 5, 18–19 (n.d.), available at european unIon external actIon 
servIce, http://eeas.europa.eu/korea_north/docs/01_04_en.pdf.
197. North Korea knowingly made the concession to adopt human rights as a 
negotiation agenda item in order to proceed with the normalization of diplomatic 
relations. However, North Korea later suspended the efforts at a human rights dia-
logue, criticizing the EU for its participation in the adoption of the human rights 
resolution on North Korea by the United Nations in 2004. See Policy Briefing PE 
491.441, Directorate-General for External Policies, European Parliament, Human 
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international criticisms of its human rights practices, particularly 
when the concerns are soundly based on verifiable facts. The North 
Korean government recognized human rights in a provision of its 
2009 constitutional amendment.198 The regime has demonstrated a 
tendency to take measures to mitigate the situation when interna-
tional criticisms are made based on identifiable facts.199 A clear illus-
tration and analysis of human rights violations can thus function as 
a catalyst for the improvement of the situation.
In dealing with North Korean human rights issues, we often 
encounter conflicting approaches: whether to emphasize engage-
ment or pursue complete isolation; whether to maintain an objective 
stance or engage in aggressive political campaigns; whether to pro-
mote dialogue and cooperation or initiate harsh criticism and pres-
sure; and whether to propose cooperation or enhance confrontation. 
The optimal strategies for the promotion and protection of North 
Korean human rights will not be found in taking only one set of 
approaches from the above list. Rather, it is important to understand 
and carefully consider the complicated internal dynamics of the 
country so that we do not sacrifice the human rights of the people of 
North Korea for some other unrelated causes.
conclusIon
In the North Korean criminal justice system, we cannot but ask 
where the origins of human rights violations lie. Are they happening 
because of flaws in North Korea’s criminal law and procedure? Are 
they happening because of non-compliance with existing law by law-
enforcement agencies? Are they not a legal problem but something 
attributable to the general system? My conclusion is that human 
rights violations cannot be attributed to any one reason above, but 
are the result of interrelated problems in the whole penal system.
First, human rights violations in the criminal justice process in 
North Korea can be ascribed to flaws in the law. The Criminal Act 
and Criminal Procedure Act have provisions incompatible with inter-
national human rights standards. The overbreadth of the definitions 
of anti-nation crimes and the insufficient procedural safeguards in 
place to protect defendants’ rights are clearly one of the significant 
sources of human rights violations. The fundamental penal princi-
ple of prioritizing social education over legal punishment seems to 
be another significant reason for human rights violations through 
extrajudicial punishment and administrative measures. In particu-
lar, nonjudicial punishment of political offenses accomplished by 
sending principal offenders and their family members to kwanriso 
clearly demonstrates the flaws of the North Korean legal system.
198. cHosonmInjujuuIInmInKongHWaguK HunBeoB [HunBeoB] [constItutIon] art. 8.
199. A good example showing this tendency is the continuous amendments of the 
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Second, notwithstanding that they are themselves far from suf-
ficient, the existing procedural rights in the current legal frame-
work are often neglected. For example, provisions in the Criminal 
Procedure Act aimed at protections such as the maximum period 
allowed for investigation, trial, and detention, the right not to be sub-
jected to torture or coerced interrogation, and the right to be tried 
in front of a judge are not fully respected. Indeed, there are many 
occasions where human rights infringements happen in violation 
of the existing law. In the same vein, law enforcement agents are 
aware that torture, cruel treatment, and the abuse of power are not 
permitted, but they violate their own laws. This chain of impunity is 
another significant contributing factor to human rights violations.
Third, the government lacks a strong will to eliminate human 
rights violations in the penal process, especially in the treatment of 
political offenders. The government and the Korean Workers’ Party 
should be blamed for not taking decisive measures to abolish wrong-
ful practices, the abuse of power, and government sponsorship of 
illegal acts.
Given that there are complicated factors to consider with regard 
to human rights violations, any efforts to improve human rights con-
ditions in North Korea should be very cautious and deliberate.200 The 
most important consideration is to base all criticisms upon concrete 
facts, and the criticisms should be combined with feasible alterna-
tives so that North Korea can be pushed to make real changes.
In the process of advocacy, I would like to propose that the fol-
lowing four principles be kept in mind. First, consistent efforts at 
engagement should be made without sacrificing high human rights 
standards. The security and humanitarian dimensions of North 
Korean issues may make it hard to focus on the problem of human 
rights, but we should never give up our efforts to promote human 
rights in the country. Human rights engagement does not exclude 
criticism or pressuring the country, and human rights standards 
should be openly maintained.
Second, more effort aimed at technical cooperation in the area 
of human rights protection should be exerted. For example, North 
Korean authorities would benefit from efforts at cooperation and 
consultation to promote reform of their judicial system, especially 
in criminal justice. Collecting evidence without relying on interro-
gation under torture is something North Korean law enforcement 
should learn about immediately. If North Korea initiates reforms 
in its criminal investigation, legal proceeding, and law enforcement 
200. There are still areas that need more explanation concerning the mechanism 
of criminal justice in North Korea. There has been no North Korean defector who 
worked as a judge, prosecutor, or attorney. More research should follow this Article. 
A full understanding of the legal procedure at the stages of investigation, pretrial, 
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processes, this change would create good momentum to promote 
human rights in North Korea more generally.
Third, although human rights discourse inevitably entails some 
political implications, we should try to maintain political neutrality 
by preserving a human-centered approach. Wherever there is human 
suffering in violation of international human rights law, the govern-
ment is under an obligation to take measures to alleviate the prob-
lem and there is no excuse that can justify human rights violations.
Finally, we should rely on the power of the moral values associ-
ated with human rights. We can and should convince the regime that 
human rights violations are, in fact, against their own belief system 
as well. No matter how slow the development of a human rights pro-
tection system may be, we can be optimistic because the accumula-
tion of small changes will achieve better protection of the rights of 
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